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Many …rms today quantify the value of individual customers and serve them di¤eren-tially; providing better privileges, discounts or other inducements to high value customers.
We refer to this practice as Customer Value-based Management (CVM). Previous research in this area and popular press o¤er numerous prescriptions that are research-based and intuitively sound. However, …rms that have adopted CVM have often met with mixed results.
For example, only a third of leading U.S. retail banks indicate that they have gained a competitive advantage from CVM. One possible factor that might account for the di¤erence between actual outcomes and anticipated results could be that real …rms implement CVM in a competitive environment. Our objective is to study CVM explicitly in a competitive setting. Our results suggest that while some recommendations and prescriptions from past research continue to hold in a competitive environment, some others do not. For example, …ring low-value customers decreases …rm pro…ts, and even improving their value may prove counter-productive. Also as the cost of CVM technology decreases, …rms adopting CVM in a competitive environment do not necessarily bene…t.
(Keywords: Competitive Games; Customer Relationship Management) Increasingly, …rms are recognizing and managing customers as assets. Using information technology, they identify individual customers and track their interactions. By leveraging sophisticated analytical tools, they estimate the value of each customer to the …rm. Armed with this information, they tailor discounts, service levels, and other inducements to each customer according to her value.
For instance, Fidelity Investments routes calls from low value customers to longer queues (Selden & Colvin 2003) . Continental Airlines e-mails only their high value customers apologizing for ‡ight delays and compensates them with frequent ‡ier miles (CIO Insight 2006) . At Harrah's, room rates range from nothing to $199 a night depending on customer value (Wall Street Journal 2004) . At Cingular Wireless, customer retention incentives such as cell phone subsidies or free airtime are based on customer value (New York Times 2006) . In this paper, we refer to such practices as Customer Value-based Management (CVM).
Customer base analysis often reveals that a small proportion of customers contribute to a large percentage of pro…ts, and a substantial proportion of customers are unpro…table (e.g. Rakesh et al. 2001 ). It stands to reason then that if a …rm treats all customers equally, not only does it waste its resources on attracting and retaining unpro…table customers, but also it under-serves pro…table customers, making it more likely that these pro…table customers may become dissatis…ed and leave.
Instead, if the …rm were to simply shift resources from unpro…table to pro…table customers, it should be able to increase pro…ts without additional spending.
In fact, researchers and industry experts have proposed that …rms can do even better (Blattberg et al. 2001 , Gupta & Lehmann 2005 , Selden & Colvin 2003 , Venkatesan & Kumar 2004 , Zeithaml et al. 2001 . By determining why some customers are unpro…table, …rms can undertake initiatives to make them pro…table. For instance, Fidelity Investments launched an initiative targeted at speci…c unpro…table customers to teach them how to use lower cost channels such as automated phone response systems or the Internet (Selden & Colvin 2003) . Further, some unpro…table customers may also be un-transformable. These so called "demon" customers (Selden & Colvin 2003) or dead-weight "lead" customers (Zeithaml et al. 2001 ) destroy …rm pro…ts, and it is argued that the …rm is better o¤ "…ring" them. The logic here is quite compelling: if a …rm has only valuable customers, this should boost its pro…tability and shareholder value.
Given the bene…ts and the compelling rationale, CVM has received unequivocal support from researchers and industry experts alike. However, it has not always led to the expected outcome.
For instance, the U.S. retail banking industry, which is one of the largest adopters of CVM, has not been enthusiastic with its results in enhancing industry pro…tability and shareholder value, despite having invested billions of dollars in CVM (Banking Strategies 1999 , US Banker 2000 . As a recent survey of leading banks indicates, only a third believe that they have gained a competitive advantage from CVM (SAS Institute 2005).
One reason why actual results di¤er from expected outcomes could be that hitherto, researchers and industry experts have by and large looked at …rms in isolation without considering competitive reactions. In this paper, we provide the …rst theoretical analysis of CVM practices when CVM capabilities are potentially available to all …rms in the industry, and compare our results with prescriptions from research and popular press that do not consider competition explicitly. Some of the questions we seek to address are How does a …rm bene…t from CVM? Should a …rm "…re" low value customers?
How does increasing customer value a¤ect …rm pro…ts?
Are …rms in an industry better o¤ with CVM? Do …rms in an industry bene…t as CVM capabilities becomes more a¤ordable?
To address these questions explicitly in a competitive context, we consider a duopoly where customers are of two types; high value Good customers and low value Poor customers. Firms have existing customers and can distinguish between their own and rival's customers. They compete to retain / acquire customers by o¤ering costly inducements. We model CVM as a technology that provides a …rm with private, imperfect information about customer type, is more accurate in determining the type of a …rm's own customers than its rival's customers, and allows a …rm to tailor inducements based on a customer's perceived type.
In this setting, we …nd that some of the intuition and prescriptions that are popular with practitioners continue to hold. For instance, CVM helps …rms retain high value customers better.
And when a …rm has better CVM accuracy than its rival, it enjoys a competitive advantage as it acquires / retains a better customer mix. But in addition, we …nd that a …rm also bene…ts from CVM as it moderates competition and lowers the …rm's overall spending on customers. With CVM, the …rm "skims the cream" of the customer base, leaving behind those who are less attractive. As the rival does not …nd it worthwhile to compete as hard for these "leftover" customers, the …rm can lower its customer spending. We refer to this as the "skimming" e¤ect and …nd that it leads to some interesting insights.
Contrary to current wisdom, in a competitive setting, Poor customers have a valuable role to play. They are crucial to the skimming e¤ect and discourage competition under CVM. Thus "…ring" or "pruning" them may only decrease pro…ts by motivating the rival to compete more intensely for Good customers.
Moreover, we …nd that not all increases in customer value have similar consequences. While increasing the value of Good customers is bene…cial, increasing the value of Poor customers may actually prove counter-productive. As may be expected, we …nd that when CVM capabilities become more a¤ordable in an industry, …rms tend to invest more. However, if the extent to which the insights about one's own customers are useful in predicting the value of rival's customers is su¢ ciently high, …rms do not necessarily bene…t when CVM becomes more a¤ordable.
We also examine extensions where one …rm is more e¢ cient than its rival and where …rms are di¤erentiated. We …nd that these …rm-level advantages interfere with skimming, and can intensify competition under CVM by making Poor customers more attractive to the …rm. As a result, with the advent of CVM, a cost-e¢ cient or di¤erentiated …rm may …nd itself worse o¤ when it does not have a su¢ ciently higher CVM accuracy than its rival.
In what follows, we review related literature in Section 2, describe our model in Section 3 and provide our analysis and results in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss several extensions. We summarize our …ndings and discuss the limitations and avenues for future research in Section 6.
Literature Review
Our work complements prior research that addresses the ability of sellers to target customers (e.g. Chen et al. 2001 , Sha¤er & Zhang 1995 , to treat their own customers di¤erently from those of the rival's (e.g. Chen 1997 , Sha¤er & Zhang 2000 and to target advertising (e.g. Iyer et. al. 2005 , Gal-Or et. al. 2006 . A common feature across much of this literature is that di¤erences in customer value arise from heterogeneity in customer preference or loyalty for competing sellers.
Loyal customers are of high value while switchers are of low value. However, it is the switchers who receive better "treatment" (lower prices or higher discounts). This is contrary to the commonly observed CVM practice of treating high value customers better. This suggests that there are instances where di¤erences in customer value are driven by factors other than loyalty. Our model seeks to address such settings, and we …nd that the nature of competitive interaction is qualitatively di¤erent.
For instance , Chen et. al. (2001) also consider a model where …rms face uncertainty about customer types and …rms classify customers independently. Customers are heterogenous on loyalty and …rms cannot perfectly distinguish their loyals from switchers. A …rm may then mistarget switchers as loyals and charge a relatively high price. To the extent that the rival classi…es these customers correctly as switchers, it can attract them without o¤ering too low a price. So mistargeting moderates competition as the left over customers in this context are easy to win over. In contrast, skimming moderates competition as the left over customers are not worth competing for. Further, mistargeting is not necessary for skimming. For instance, skimming moderates competition even when one …rm has perfect information and its rival has none.
Our work is also related to the research on credit market competition when lenders ration credit by screening borrowers based on their repayment ability. Closest to our work are Broecker (1990) and Banerjee (2005) . Broecker (1990) restricts all lenders to have the same screening accuracy and looks at the impact of imperfect independent screening on competition. Banerjee (2005) extends this model to allow for lenders to have di¤erent screening accuracies and analyzes their incentives to adopt a superior screening technology. However, given their market context, they assume that Poor borrowers are a priori unpro…table and are always denied credit. Thus lenders compete only for perceived Good borrowers. This moderates competition as some of the borrowers who are denied credit by one lender may be classi…ed as Good by a rival, and are easy to acquire 1 .
So, unlike in skimming, lenders are not deterred from competing by the prospect of acquiring less attractive borrowers. Consequently, in contrast to our model, increasing the value of Poor borrowers always bene…ts lenders. Also in Banerjee (2005) , an improvement in a lender's screening accuracy never bene…ts a rival, whereas in our model a rival may bene…t if skimming su¢ ciently moderates 1 They restrict attention to the case when the expected returns from a borrower classi…ed as Poor is negative even at the highest interest rate, whereas the expected returns from a cross-classi…ed borrower is positive.
competition.
Furthermore, a common feature across Chen et. al. (2001) , Broecker (1990) and Banerjee (2005) is that imperfectly correlated classi…cations moderate competition. However, we …nd that when one …rm is more cost-e¢ cient than the other, or customers prefer one seller over the other, competition may in fact be more intense as these …rm-level advantages interfere with skimming.
Model
Consider two competing …rms, namely Firm 1 and Firm 2. To begin with, we assume that each …rm has a customer base of size s. Later, in Section 5.1, we allow for Firm 1 to have a larger customer base than Firm 2. We assume that …rms o¤er inducements such as discounts, free products, or additional services in order to retain their customers or to attract rival's customers, while customers choose the …rm that o¤ers them the best inducement 2 . In Section 5.3, we consider that customers attach a premium to buying from their current …rm. Initially, we assume that inducements only in ‡uence a customer's switching behavior, but not their consumption behavior. In some instances, this assumption is fairly realistic. For instance, a customer retention incentive such as a subsidized cell phone is likely to induce a customers to stay with the service provider, but may not cause her to use more minutes. Later, in Section 5.4, we examine the case when inducements also a¤ect consumption behavior.
We take inducements to be variable costs that are incurred only if the customer chooses the …rm. Firms are assumed to be equally e¢ cient in o¤ering inducements both within and across customer bases. In other words, it costs the same for both …rms to o¤er a given level of inducement to any customer. In Section 5.2, we allow for Firm 1 to be more e¢ cient than Firm 2 in providing inducements. We assume that inducement spending strictly increases with the level of inducement.
So, without loss of generality, we can set the cost of providing an inducement of level d to be equal to d. We will use the term "inducement" to refer to the level of inducements, and the term "inducement spending" for the cost of providing the inducement.
When a customer chooses a …rm o¤ering an inducement d, let (d) be the …rm's pro…t from the customer. As the inducement costs d, we can express (d) as
2 If both …rms o¤er the same inducement, the customer stays with her current …rm.
where is de…ned as the intrinsic value of the customer, or simply customer value. Customers may di¤er in their value due to a combination of factors such as the basket of products and services bought, purchase volume and frequency, product returns, customer support requests and so on.
This formulation succinctly captures the idea that customer pro…tability is the outcome of both customer behavior and …rm's actions. Since inducements do not a¤ect consumption behavior, is independent of d. We can interpret as the customer pro…tability at some reference level of inducements, with inducements being measured relative to this reference level 3 . Alternately, in the context of Eqn.
(1), is the inducement at which customer pro…tability is zero.
As we will see in our analysis, it is important to distinguish between a change in and a change in d, even though the net e¤ect on customer pro…tability may be the same. A lower level of service translates to a lower d. On the other hand, if a customer's behavior changes such that she is more pro…table for the same inducement level then this translates to an increase in . Also, if both …rms use a more e¢ cient technology to deliver the same inducement at a lower cost, we can represent this as an increase in , as the inducement at which customer pro…tability is zero is now higher 4 .
We assume that customers may be of two types based on their value; high value Good customers and low value Poor customers. We abstract away from the details of the di¤erences between Good and Poor customers and take their values to be G and P respectively, with G > P . Let 2 (0; 1) be the proportion of Good customers in each …rm's customer base. , G and P are taken to be common knowledge for both …rms Even when a …rm does not have a CVM information system, it is still likely to have a rudimentary information system that enables it to identify its existing customers, for instance, based on purchase records or ongoing subscriptions. Consequently, we assume that …rms know who their current customers are. This is a reasonable assumption in industries such as banking or telecom, but may not be as palatable when …rms go through dealers or distributors. Since the ability to identify customers is a pre-requisite for CVM, this assumption is reasonable for industries that have adopted CVM.
3 A lower than usual service level or a new fee is then represented as a negative inducement. Note that we do not restrict inducements to be positive. 4 Firm e¢ ciency can be incorporated explicitly in our customer pro…tability equation as
where denotes e¢ ciency and d is the cost of providing an inducement d. A higher means lower e¢ ciency. When both …rms are equally e¢ cient, a decrease in can be equivalently represented as an increase in . Moreover, to the extent that there are common customer characteristics across the two customer bases, the insights a …rm gains from analyzing the behavior of its own customers may be useful in inferring the behavior of its rival's customers, even though it does not have access to 5 We will refer to a CVM information system as simply CVM.
their transaction histories. For instance, customer value may be correlated with easily obtainable customer characteristics such as demographics or lifestyle variables. A …rm could then classify its rival's customers based on the patterns it observes in its own customer base. While this is unlikely to be as accurate as classi…cation based on actual transaction data, nevertheless such analysis is still likely to yield some useful information. The degree to which it is useful is likely to vary with the industry and technology. So we assume that CVM provides some information about rival's customers as well.
We now introduce the required notation to characterize the nature and accuracy of CVM classi…cation. Let g and p represent the events that the true type of a customer in Firm 1's customer base is respectively Good and Poor. Similarly, let G and P respectively represent the corresponding events in Firm 2's customer base. Let g 1 and p 1 (G 1 and P 1 ) represent the events that Firm 1 classi…es a customer to be Good and Poor in Firm 1's (Firm 2's) customer base. Similarly, let g 2 and p 2 (G 2 and P 2 ) represent the events that Firm 2 classi…es a customer to be Good and Poor in Firm 1's (Firm 2's) customer base. We represent compound events and conditional events in the usual manner. For instance, g 1 p 2 is the event g 1 \ p 2 that a Firm 1's customer is classi…ed as Good by Firm 1 and Poor by Firm 2. And, for instance, P 1 jG 2 is the event that Firm 2's customer is classi…ed as Poor by Firm 1, given that Firm 2 classi…ed her as Good. Let Pr (X) be the probability of event X. For instance, we have Pr (g) = Pr (G) = .
When CVM is imperfect, customers will be misclassi…ed. To start with, consider the two extreme scenarios -non-informative CVM (or no CVM) and perfect CVM. Non-informative CVM will perform no better than random classi…cation. We can expect that a random proportion of customers are classi…ed as Good, and the remaining 1 as Poor. So on an average, proportion of Poor customers are misclassi…ed as Good and 1 proportion of Good customers are misclassi…ed as Poor. On the other hand, with perfect CVM there is no misclassi…cation. Imperfect CVM falls between these two extremes, with less than of Poor customers and 1 of Good customers misclassi…ed. Thus CVM accuracy can be characterized based on the misclassi…cation probabilities.
We assume that classi…cation is consistent at the aggregate level, i.e. …rms always classify proportion of customers as Good and the remaining 1 as Poor. We have
In this context, the probabilities of both types of misclassi…cation are equal 6 , and we need only one parameter to represent CVM accuracy 7 . We now de…ne the CVM Accuracy Index, referred to simply as CVM accuracy, based on the misclassi…cation probabilities as follows. If I 1 2 [0; 1] is Firm 1's CVM accuracy, then the misclassi…cation probabilities are given by 8
Thus, I 1 = 0 represents non-informative CVM where random classi…cation leads to a misclassi…cation probability of (1 ). On the other hand, I 1 = 1 represents perfect CVM with no misclassi…cation. Similarly, let I 2 2 [0; 1] be Firm 2's CVM accuracy in its own customer base. Let k 2 (0; 1) be the degree to which insights about one's own customers is useful in predicting the type of rival's customers, so that kI 1 and kI 2 are the CVM accuracies of Firm 1 and Firm 2 respectively in their rival's customer base.
When both …rms have CVM, we assume that given the true type of the customer, the classi…ca-tion decisions by the …rms are independent. In other words, we assume conditional independence 9 .
It is worthwhile to note that conditional independence does allow for the overall classi…cations by the …rms to be correlated. For instance, in either customer base, the correlation in classi…cations by the …rms is the product of CVM accuracies, given by kI 1 I 2 , which increases when CVM accuracy of either …rm increases.
We also develop notation for the expected value of customers with and without information about their perceived types. Let be the average value of customers in either customer base, given
Let (X) represent the expected customer value conditional on event X. For instance, (g 1 ) is the expected value of a customer classi…ed as Good by Firm 1 in its customer base, and (g 1 g 2 ) is
Since CVM is informative by assumption, the correlation is always positive and I1 2 [0; 1]. 9 For instance, Pr (g1p2 j g) = Pr (g1 j g) Pr (p2 j g) the expected value of a customer classi…ed as Good by both …rms in Firm 1's customer base.
We analyze a two stage game where …rms …rst invest in CVM capabilities and then compete for customers by o¤ering inducements. In the …rst stage, …rms simultaneously decide on the level of investment in CVM capabilities. Their investment determines how much customer data …rms collect or how sophisticated their analytical techniques are. Let c > 0 be the CVM investment cost parameter. If a …rm invests 1 2 cI 2 in CVM, then it acquires a CVM accuracy of I and kI respectively about its own and its rival's customers 10 . Typically c and k would vary across industries as well as with CVM technology. We assume that both …rms have access to the same technology.
In the second stage, knowing each other's CVM investment decisions, …rms compete for customers by deciding on their inducements. We restrict our attention to a single period of interaction.
To represent mixed strategies, we will use f i ( 3. Inducements a¤ect only customer switching behavior. 4. Firms are not di¤erentiated and are equally e¢ cient in o¤ering inducements. 5. A …rm can identify its customers. A customer who is not its own, must belong to its rival. 6. CVM classi…cations are independent, private and consistent at the aggregate level. 7. Firms have access to the same CVM technology. 8. If CVM accuracy about one's own customers is I, then it is kI about rival's customers, k 2 (0; 1). 9. Single period of interaction in the inducement stage.
1 0 However, we shall refer to I rather than 1 2 cI 2 as the CVM investment decision.
We solve for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the two stage game. We start with the second stage and look at the impact of CVM on the competition for customers. We analyze three scenarios.
1. The simple scenario where neither …rm has CVM, which serves as our benchmark.
2. The scenario where only one of the …rms has CVM, which helps us understand the basic intuition behind how CVM works in a competitive setting.
3. The general scenario where both …rms have CVM.
As …rms can perfectly discriminate between their own and the rival's customers, …rm pro…ts in each customer base depend only on the inducements in that customer base. Therefore we can analyze the competitive interactions one customer base at a time. Further, the analysis of the interactions within each customer base is identical. So, while we provide the results for both customer bases, we focus explicitly only on Firm 1's customer base when analyzing these scenarios.
Equilibrium without CVM
When neither …rm has CVM, they cannot di¤erentiate between Good and Poor types. So all customers appear to be of expected value to both …rms. This leads to Bertrand competition.
In equilibrium …rms o¤er an inducement in each customer base. They retain their existing customers, but realize no pro…ts. Formally, the equilibrium strategies and pro…ts are given by
Thus Poor customers receive an inducement that exceeds their value and are essentially subsidized by Good customers. If a …rm were to now measure the pro…tability of each of its customers, it would …nd Poor customers unpro…table and Good customers pro…table. In other words, a fraction of the customer base is pro…table while the remaining destroy …rm value, a scenario that is often described in the popular press and has been used by researchers and industry experts to urge …rms to adopt CVM. Our benchmark case represents this starting point.
Equilibrium when One Firm has CVM
Suppose one of the …rms were to adopt CVM. Say for instance Firm 1 pioneers the use of CVM in its industry. So Firm 1 has an information advantage over Firm 2. It has been argued that Firm 1 will bene…t from this information advantage by selectively retaining or acquiring Good customers.
While intuitively sound, this argument is incomplete as it leaves the rival out of the picture. We now examine this scenario explicitly accounting for competition.
Consider Firm 1's customer base. Ex-ante, all customers appear to be the same and of expected value for Firm 2. On the other hand, Firm 1 can discriminate between customer types to a certain degree and values its perceived Good customers more than its perceived Poor customers. We have
where, as de…ned earlier, (p 1 ) and (g 1 ) are the expected value of Firm 1's perceived Poor and
Good customers respectively. In other words, using CVM information, Firm 1 can "de-average" the value of its customers. Now, not only can Firm 1 o¤er better inducements to its perceived Good customers than to its perceived Poor customers, but also, since (g 1 ) > , it can o¤er a higher inducement to its perceived Good customers than what Firm 2 can. Subsequently, Firm 2 is more likely to acquire Poor customers than Good customers, and will be left with a higher proportion of Poor customers than there were in the customer base to begin with. Intuitively, Firm 1 "skims the cream" of the customer base and takes away the more valuable customers. Since the "left-over" customers are of lower value, Firm 2 is discouraged from competing as intensely as in the benchmark case. Stated di¤erently, the expected customer value conditional on Firm 2 acquiring the customer is lower than the ex-ante expected value . This forces Firm 2 to o¤er an inducement lower than to avoid incurring a loss. This is similar to the winner's curse in a common value …rst-price auction (Milgrom & Weber 1982) . Thus Firm 1 bene…ts from CVM not only because it retains a better customer mix, but also because its inducement spending is lower as competition is less intense.
Lemma 1 When only Firm 1 has CVM, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. But there exists a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. In Firm 1's customer base, the equilibrium strategies are given by
The equilibrium pro…ts are given by
Proofs for all lemmas and propositions are provided in Appendices A and B respectively.
We …nd that competition ensures that …rms o¤er an inducement of at least (p 1 ). Under pure strategies, Firm 2 will always incur a loss no matter what inducement it o¤ers, since Firm 1 can take away the pro…table customers leaving behind only the unpro…table ones. Thus there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. There is, however, a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. In equilibrium, Firm 1 o¤ers better inducements to its perceived Good customers than its perceived The same analysis applies to Firm 2's customer base and equilibrium pro…ts are given by 1 = s (1 ) kI 1 ( G P ) and 2 = 0.
Equilibrium when Both Firms have CVM
An increasingly common situation is one where not only the …rm but also its rival has imperfect CVM. This scenario has not received much attention in prior work. We now look at the impact of CVM in this setting.
Lemma 2 When both …rms have CVM, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. But there exists a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. In Firm 1's customer base, the equilibrium strategies are given by
Again consider Firm 1's customer base. We can expect that …rms o¤ers a higher inducement to their perceived Good customers as they are of higher value. But …rms also have to consider how a given customer will be classi…ed by their rival. Consider those customers who are classi…ed as Poor by Firm 1. Some of them will also be classi…ed as Poor by Firm 2, while others will be cross-classi…ed as Good. Now, as long as I 1 < 1, we have that
That is, amongst the pool of customers perceived as Poor by Firm 1, those who are also classi…ed as
Poor by Firm 2 are relatively less attractive than those who are cross-classi…ed as Good, provided On the one hand, some of these customers will be classi…ed as Good by Firm 2. This creates an incentive to compete intensely as such customers are of high value to both …rms. On the other hand, the remaining will be cross-classi…ed as Poor by Firm 2. Since Firm 1 can pro…tably skim Firm 2's perceived Poor customer pool, this relaxes competition. This trade-o¤ leads to a mixed strategy for perceived Good customers in equilibrium 12 .
The pro…t opportunity from skimming moderates the competition for perceived Good customers. Indeed, equilibrium pro…ts are determined by skimming. As Firm 1 has to o¤er an inducement equal to d 2p (= (p 1 p 2 )) to pro…tably retain all cross-classi…ed customers (of value (g 1 p 2 )), its pro…ts are given by s Pr (
If however I 1 = 1, all of Firm 1's perceived Poor customer are truly Poor and Firm 2 no longer has an opportunity to skim. Then it derives zero pro…ts 13 .
1 1 This is true even though Firm 2 may have lower accuracy, i.e. kI2 < I1. We only require that I1 < 1 so that (p1) < (p1g2). 1 2 Our assumption that classi…cations by both …rms are consistent at the aggregate level implies that the crossclassi…cation probabilities are equal. For instance, Pr (g1p2) = Pr (g1) Pr (g1g2) = Pr (g2) Pr (g1g2) = Pr (p1g2)
As shown in the Technical Appendix, this results in both …rms having identical equilibrium inducement strategies even though they have di¤erent accuracies. If cross-classi…cation probabilities are not equal, this does not alter our analysis drastcially, and we expect qualitatively similar results.
1 3 Since k < 1, Firm 1 always makes positive pro…ts from its customers whenever it has non-zero accuracy.
The analysis in Firm 2's customer base is identical and equilibrium pro…ts are given by 14
To summarize, when both …rms have imperfect CVM, cross-classi…cation allows …rms to skim each other's perceived Poor customer pool, which moderates competition for both perceived Poor and Good customers. Note that the pro…t opportunity from skimming, for say Firm 1, depends not only on the cross-classi…cation probability Pr (p 1 g 2 ) and the value of cross-classi…ed customers (p 1 g 2 ), but also on the extent to which skimming deters Firm 2 from competing for perceived Poor customers, which is given by (p 1 p 2 ). Consequently, an exogenous increase in the value of Poor customers P has two e¤ects. On the one hand, it increases the value of cross-classi…ed customers
On the other hand, (p 1 p 2 ) also increases as Poor customers are more attractive, thereby decreasing the extent to which skimming deters competition. The latter always o¤sets the former and …rm pro…ts are lower than before.
This aspect distinguishes the nature of competitive interaction in our model from that in Broecker (1990) and in Banerjee (2005) . Both of these models make the following assumptions.
1. Perceived Poor borrowers are ex-ante unpro…table, i.e. they are unpro…table at the highest possible interest rate.
2. Cross-classi…ed borrowers (i.e. those who are classi…ed as Poor by one lender and Good by a rival) are still pro…table to serve.
Consequently, the optimal strategy for a lender is to always reject perceived Poor borrowers irrespective of how a rival might classify them, and lenders essentially compete only for perceived Good borrowers. Since lenders know that some of their perceived Good borrowers will be crossclassi…ed as Poor by the rival and rejected, these borrowers can be acquired pro…tably at the highest interest rate, which moderates competition for perceived Good borrowers. Thus there is no notion of the rival being discouraged from competing because of skimming. Consequently, an increase in the value of Poor borrowers (i.e. their repayment probability) is always bene…cial to …rms as its only e¤ect is to increase the value of cross-classi…ed borrowers.
While both …rms make pro…ts, as may be expected it is the …rm with better information in a customer base that makes higher pro…ts since it targets Good customers with better inducements more often to obtain a better customer mix 15 . This is re ‡ected in the di¤erence in …rm pro…ts in a customer base, for instance 1 2 , which is given by
Proposition 1 The …rm with better CVM accuracy in a customer base makes higher pro…ts. The di¤ erence in pro…ts increases with the di¤ erence in accuracies.
Thus a …rm's competitive advantage in a customer base is directly linked to its information advantage. A …rm can strengthen its competitive position by acquiring additional customer information or improving its CVM technology.
Impact of Improvement in CVM Capability
We next look at how an improvement in a …rm's CVM capability a¤ect inducement spending, pro…ts and customer welfare. We have already seen that CVM reduces spending on customers relative to the benchmark case by moderating competition. We would like to know whether an increase in a …rm's CVM accuracy further moderates competition.
Proposition 2 When a …rm's CVM accuracy increases, competition in a customer base is moderated further if the rival's accuracy is not too high.
We look at combined …rm pro…ts of both …rms as a measure of competitive intensity. The e¤ect of an increase in a …rm's CVM accuracy will di¤er across customer bases since both the …rm's and its rival's accuracy vary with the customer base. Figure 2 . For a particular k, each curve represents the maximum I 2 up to which an increase in I 1 further moderates competition. As k decreases, the bound on I 2 increases 16 . In general, if Firm 2's accuracy is su¢ ciently high then competition intensi…es as the correlation in classi…cations is high.
1 5 As both …rms have identical equilibrium inducement strategies, they spend the same on inducements. The di¤erence in …rm pro…ts is then driven only by the di¤erence in customer mix. 1 6 It is possible that the bound for I2 is higher in either of the customer bases, so that competition may be moderated in one but intensi…ed in the other. For instance in Figure 2 , when k = 0:4, the bound for I2 is higher in Firm 1's customer base when I1 < 0:826, and is higher in Firm 2's customer base otherwise. When Firm 1's CVM accuracy increases, the inducement to perceived Poor customers always decreases. This can also relax the competition for perceived Good customers by increasing the pro…t opportunity from cross-classi…cation. However, the extent of cross-classi…cation decreases as the correlation in classi…cations kI 1 I 2 increases. When the correlation is high, this can intensify competition for perceived Good customers and this may dominate the overall impact on competitive intensity. We next look at the impact on pro…ts.
Proposition 3 When a …rm's CVM accuracy increases, its pro…t from customers always increases, while its rival's pro…t increases if 2 1 2 ; 1 and CVM accuracies are not too high.
Consider Firm 1's customer base. When Firm 1's accuracy increases, the increase in its pro…t opportunity (g 1 p 2 ) (p 1 p 2 ) always o¤sets the decrease in cross-classi…cation probability Pr(g 1 p 2 ).
So even if competition becomes more intense (as discussed in Proposition 1), Firm 1's pro…ts increase as this is o¤set by the improvement in customer mix (as discussed in Proposition 2). Similarly, Firm 1's pro…ts always increase in Firm 2's customer base.
For Firm 2, the customer mix always worsens and in particular (g 2 p 1 ) decreases. Interestingly however, Firm 2's pro…ts may still increase. This is because the extent to which skimming deters competition for perceived Poor customer increases, or (p 1 p 2 ) decreases. So Firm 2's pro…t oppor-tunity from cross-classi…cation (g 2 p 1 ) (p 1 p 2 ) may still increase. When the CVM accuracies of both …rms are not too high, the moderation in competition is su¢ cient to o¤set the worsening of customer mix and Firm 2's pro…ts also increase. The interaction in Firm 2's customer base is similar, and we …nd that Firm 2's pro…ts across both customer bases increases when CVM accuracies are not too high. Note that in Banerjee (2005) , a rival's pro…ts can never increase when a lender's screening accuracy increases. This is because screening per se has no impact on the competition for perceived Poor borrowers as they are always just rejected. We next consider how CVM a¤ects consumer welfare.
CVM practices have often raised concerns about discrimination and unfairness since it involves "red-lining" some low value customers (e.g. Business Week 2000). Such customers are charged higher fees, provided poorer service or even discouraged from shopping with the …rm. Firms have countered criticism by arguing that CVM enables them to serve high value customers better and that rolling back these measures would be unfair to these customers as they would be forced to subsidize others. But this assumes that the gains from reduced cross-subsidy accrue to Good customers. We …nd that this is not necessarily true. While CVM does reduce the extent of cross-subsidization, and on an average Good customers do receive better inducements than Poor customers, competition may be moderated to such an extent that even Good customers are worse o¤ than before. So the bene…ts from reduced cross-subsidization are instead appropriated by the …rms.
Proposition 4 Relative to the benchmark case, Good customers are worse o¤ with CVM when I 1 and I 2 are both not too high. 
Impact of Changes to Customer Base
We now consider the impact of changes to the customer base. A frequently mentioned bene…t of CVM is that …rms can take measures to improve the value of its low value customers. In fact, some advise that …rms should either make low-value customers more valuable or "…re" them (e.g. Selden & Colvin 2003) . Since such customers are usually unpro…table to begin with, they argue that the …rm can never lose by taking such steps. However, we …nd that when we consider the e¤ect of competition, such measures may prove counter productive.
With CVM, when a …rm's accuracy is less than perfect, pruning perceived Poor customers has two unintended consequences. First, in the process of pruning Poor customers, the …rm will also prune some Good customers as it cannot identify customer types perfectly. Second, by stripping its customer base of Poor customers, the …rm would encourage the rival to compete more aggressively for its customers. Both these outcomes can reduce …rm's pro…ts. In fact, even when a …rm can identify customer types perfectly, customer pruning can still be counter productive. To see this, suppose Firm 1 has perfect CVM accuracy about its customers, so that I 1 = 1. Its pro…ts in its customer base are given by . Our analysis reveals yet another reason such e¤orts can back-…re. In fact, we …nd that Poor customers are actually "valuable" to the …rm as they determine the pro…ts realized from Good customers.
Again suppose Firm 1 has perfect accuracy. But now, instead of …ring Poor customers, suppose it increases their value, i.e. it increases P . For instance, a bank may educate its low value customers to use lower cost online channels. To the extent that its rival also o¤ers online channels and customer behavior in using online channels is …rm agnostic, we can expect that these customers are more valuable to its rival as well. So the increase in customer value is common to both …rms. Now, not only is the increase in the value of Poor customers competed away, but also the e¤ectiveness of skimming in deterring the rival decreases, thereby reducing the pro…ts from Good customers. So Firm 1's pro…ts always decrease. Instead, suppose Firm 1 increases the value of all Good customers, thereby increasing G . Now, even though Good customers become more valuable to both …rms, still skimming allows Firm 1 to extract additional pro…ts as the increase in inducements is lower than the increase in customer value. So Firm 1's pro…ts always increase.
Finally, suppose Firm 1 increases the value of some of its Poor customers to that of the Good customers, or increases. If 1 2 , competition always intensi…es and Firm 1's pro…ts reduce.
1 7 We assume that Firm 2 observes the changes in Firm 1's customer base before both …rms compete for customers. A limitation of our approach is that it ignores the potential dynamics of the process. A more elaborate approach would be to consider a two period version of the inducement game.
1 8 While it is true that Firm 1 realizes zero pro…ts from its Poor customers in equilibrium and does not per se incur a loss, it does not follow that Firm 1 is indi¤erent between …ring and not …ring Poor customers. In fact, Eqn (13) shows that they are strictly worse o¤ by …ring them.
We summarize these results in the following proposition. Thus, not all increases in customer base value are the same, and can lead to drastically di¤erent results. Firms may be better o¤ focusing on improving the value of their Good customers.
Proposition 5 When a …rm has perfect information about its customers a. Increasing the value of Poor (Good) customers decreases (increases) the …rm's pro…ts.
b. Increasing the proportion of Good customers decreases the …rm's pro…ts if c. Reducing the number of Poor customers (by retrenching / …ring) decreases the …rm's pro…ts.
CVM Investment Decisions
We now analyze the competitive interaction in CVM investment decisions and focus on the symmetric (in investment strategies) sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Typically, as CVM technologies and methodologies mature, we can expect that the CVM cost declines, and …rms are likely to acquire a higher level of accuracy. While …rms have an incentive to improve their CVM accuracy, such improvements also a¤ect rival's pro…ts and the competition may become more intense. :The kinks in equilibrium investment and pro…ts correspond to the transition from c c to c > c .
2 0 Firms are worse o¤ relative to their position prior to the decrease in CVM cost. They may still be better o¤ than in the benchmark case. for perceived Good customers. In particular, this is because of the "spillover" k across customer bases 22 . As k increases, the maximum accuracy I beyond which …rm pro…ts decline also decreases. Going back to Figure 4 , we see that when CVM investment cost is low, equilibrium investment levels are high. Now if CVM becomes more a¤ordable, equilibrium investments continue to increase.
But a …rm's gain from higher accuracy is more than o¤set by the loss from its rival's higher accuracy.
If k is su¢ ciently high, this even o¤sets the savings from the lower investment cost. Thus …rms can become worse o¤ when CVM becomes more a¤ordable. This is in line with the observation in Banking Strategies (1999) that retail banks may not have bene…ted from CVM as it eventually led to more intense competition for high value customers.
It also suggests that in regulated industries such as insurance, restrictions on the extent to which …rms can discriminate between customers may prove to be a blessing in disguise. Chen et. al.
(2001) also …nd that an increase in industry targeting accuracy eventually leads to a decrease in …rm pro…ts. They propose that this may explain why direct marketers have voluntarily adopted measures to protect customer privacy. Similarly, …rms in industries adopting CVM may also …nd it worthwhile to self regulate their ability to obtain and use customer information.
We analyze several extensions to our model. First, we consider that one of the …rms may have a larger customer base. Next, we look at how other …rm-level advantages such as cost-e¢ ciency and …rm di¤erentiation a¤ect the impact of CVM. Lastly, we consider that inducements a¤ect not only customers'switching behavior but also their consumption behavior.
Customer Base Size
Suppose Firm 1 has a larger customer base than Firm 2. Let S; 1 S respectively be the size of the customer bases of Firm 1 and Firm 2 respectively, where S 2 1 2 ; 1 . As before, in the inducement stage of the game, the interactions in one customer base are independent of those in the other. In particular the size of one customer base does not a¤ect the interactions in the other. Thus our earlier analysis holds except for the rescaling of pro…ts. When both …rms have CVM, we have from
Propositions 1, 2, 4 and 5 are not a¤ected as they characterize interactions within a customer base.
Proposition 3, which considers …rm pro…ts across customer bases, is modi…ed in that the bounds on CVM accuracies depend on S (refer Appendix B).
In the investment stage of the game, we …nd that there is always an equilibrium where Firm 1 invests more than Firm 2 (unless c is small, in which case both …rms invest to the maximum). But this equilibrium is not necessarily unique. As the analysis of the general case is complicated 23 , we set = 1 2 and derive su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness. In Appendix B, we show the equilibrium is unique when k is su¢ ciently small and when Firm 1 is su¢ ciently larger than Firm 2. Figure 6 shows the equilibrium investments and pro…ts as a function of CVM investment cost in a particular parametric scenario when the equilibrium is unique 24 . We …nd that as CVM becomes more a¤ordable, higher investment by Firm 1 may make it less attractive for Firm 2 to invest (c 2 < c < c 3 in Figure 6 ) and may also make Firm 2 worse o¤ (c 2 < c < c 4 in Figure 6 ). On the other hand, if Firm 1 already has invested to the maximum extent, further decrease in CVM cost may make Firm 1 worse o¤ since Firm 2's investment increases (c 0 < c < c 1 in Figure 6 ).
Cost E¢ ciency
A …rm may be more e¢ cient than its rival by virtue of its unique business processes or technologies, resulting in a lower cost structure. We look at whether CVM helps reinforce this existing source pro…ts as it has a cost advantage. The equilibrium strategies and pro…ts are given by 26 (15-b) Note that Firm 1's pro…t increases with the average value of customers. Thus it is also relatively more e¢ cient in harnessing an increase in customer value.
The results and formal analysis when both …rms have imperfect CVM are provided in Appendix A and the Technical Appendix respectively. We discuss the intuition here.
We saw that when both …rms are equally e¢ cient, skimming determines Firm 2's pro…t opportunity from perceived Good customers by discouraging Firm 1 from competing intensely for perceived Poor customers. For instance, in its own customer base, Firm 1's inducement to its perceived Poor customers is lower than their ex-ante expected value. Firm 1 retains only those customers classi…ed as Poor by both …rms, i.e. the p 1 p 2 customers. It does not compete to retain the cross-classi…ed p 1 g 2 customers, since the additional gain from doing so is more than o¤set by the loss on the retained p 1 p 2 customers. So skimming determines Firm 2's pro…t opportunity from perceived Good customers, and this in turn moderates competition for customers classi…ed as Good by both …rms, i.e. the g 1 g 2 customers.
However, when Firm 1 is more e¢ cient, the higher margin makes it attractive for Firm 1 to compete for the cross-classi…ed p 1 g 2 customers as well. This reduces Firm 2's pro…t opportunity from perceived Good customers and motivates it to compete harder for g 1 g 2 customers. In turn, this intensi…es the competition faced by Firm 1 for perceived Good customers. Thus Firm 1's higher e¢ ciency reduces Firm 2's pro…t opportunity from skimming and consequently, CVM moderates competition to a lesser extent relative to the benchmark case. This has three implications.
1. For Firm 2 to derive positive pro…ts, its CVM accuracy should be su¢ ciently high in order for it to be able to skim in spite of Firm 1's cost advantage. Figure 7 shows the range of I 1 and I 2 when Firm 2 makes positive pro…ts in Firm 1's customer base 27 . Each curve corresponds to a particular and Firm 2 makes positive pro…ts in the region above the curve.
Higher Firm 1's e¢ ciency, smaller the range over which Firm 2 can realize positive pro…ts.
2 6 To ensure uniqeuness, we restrict attention to equilibria where weakly dominated actions are not employed. Interestingly, over some range of I 2 , Firm 1's CVM accuracy should neither be too high nor too low. When I 1 is low, Firm 1 competes primarily on the basis of its cost advantage and this may completely o¤set Firm 2's skimming pro…t opportunity. When I 1 is high, Firm 2's potential pro…t opportunity is low to begin with, as the value of the cross-classi…ed p 1 g 2 is low, and hence is more easily o¤set by Firm 1's cost advantage. Between these extremes, Firm 2's pro…ts initially increase and then decrease with I 1 . So when Firm 1 is more e¢ cient, Firm 2 may bene…t from an improvement in Firm 1's accuracy as this encourages Firm 1 to compete more on the basis of its CVM information. 2. Firm 1 is not necessarily better o¤ than in the benchmark case, even when it has a higher accuracy than Firm 2. In Appendix B, we show that when I 1 = I 2 = I, Firm 1 is worse o¤ than in the benchmark case if I is su¢ ciently low. We also show that when Firm 1's e¢ ciency is su¢ ciently high, Firm 1 is worse o¤ even when I = 1. Figure 8 shows the minimum I 1 for Firm 1 to be better o¤ as a function of I 2 . Each curve corresponds to a particular .
When Firm 1's e¢ ciency is high, it competes primarily on the basis of its cost-advantage to counter Firm 2's skimming, which intensi…es competition and dissipates pro…ts. We now look at how changes by Firm 1 to its customer base a¤ect its pro…ts. Firm 1's pro…ts in its customer base when it has perfect accuracy are given by
As before, increasing the value of Poor customers intensi…es competition for Good customers, and this is re ‡ected in the …rst term in Eqn (16). But Firm 1 is now also more e¢ cient in harnessing an increase in customer value, which is captured by the second term. When Firm 1's e¢ ciency is not too high, its pro…ts again decline when P increases (refer Appendix B). But when its e¢ ciency is su¢ ciently high, the gains from e¢ ciency more than o¤set the losses from intensi…ed competition, and Firm 1 bene…ts from an increase in the value of Poor customers. Similarly, an increase in the proportion of Good customers is always bene…cial to Firm 1 if its e¢ ciency is su¢ ciently high.
Irrespective of its e¢ ciency, Firm 1 always bene…ts from an increase in the value of Good customers, not only because of skimming but also because of its higher e¢ ciency. Lastly, …ring Poor customers always reduces …rm pro…ts. This is not surprising, since not only is competition for Good customers more intense, but also, Firm 1 in fact derives positive pro…ts from Poor customers when it is more e¢ cient. 
We …nd that qualitatively similar results as in Proposition 5 hold in this case.
Di¤erentiated Firms
Firms may be di¤erentiated so that customers may prefer the …rm they are currently buying from.
Or customers may face a switching cost because of contractual obligations or the lack of familiarity with a rival seller. Let t 1 and t 2 respectively be the premium that 
Inducements A¤ect Switching and Consumption
When …rms tailor their inducements to individual customers, this might not only a¤ect a customer's choice of whom to buy from, but may also a¤ect her choice of what all, how much or how frequently to buy. If customer spending increases su¢ ciently in response to inducements, then a …rm has an additional incentive to o¤er higher inducements, for this not only improves acquisition / retention but also customer pro…tability. We incorporate such behavior in our model by allowing intrinsic customer value to change with the level of inducements. Let~ G (d) and~ P (d) be the intrinsic customer value of Good and Poor customer types respectively. Let G (d) and P (d) denote the pro…tability of Good and Poor customers respectively at inducement d, so that
For the analysis to be meaningful as well as tractable, we restrict the shape of the customer pro…tability functions as follows. For either customer type t 2 fG; P g, t (d) is strictly concave and C 1 . 0 t (d) < 0 for d su¢ ciently large, so that pro…tability does not perpetually increase with inducements. t (d) > 0 for some d, so that customers are worth serving when inducements are not too large. Lastly, G (d) > P (d) for all d, so that Good customers are always more pro…table than Poor customers.
As before, in the benchmark case, we have Bertrand competition and …rms realize zero pro…ts.
To understand how the competitive interaction with CVM changes, we examine the case when CVM provides perfect information about one's own customers and no information about rival's customers, i.e. I 1 = I 2 = 1, k = 0 28 . All of this impacts our analysis only if Good and Poor customers respond di¤erently (in varying their consumption) to changes in inducements. For only then is there an opportunity for the …rm to incorporate this additional di¤erence between customer types when serving its customers, while its rival cannot. We formalize this notion in our analysis in Appendix B.
We …nd that CVM continues to moderate competition. For instance Firm 2 o¤ers lower inducements to Firm 1's customers than in the benchmark case, since the left over customers are again less attractive. If the pro…tability of Good customers is not too di¤erent from that of the average customer 29 , then Firm 1 has an incentive to lower its inducement to its Good customers. The nature of interaction is similar to that before and Proposition 5 holds qualitatively. On the other hand, if the the pro…tability of Good customers is su¢ ciently di¤erent from the average customer, then Firm 1 in fact …nds it worthwhile to o¤er its Good customers higher inducements than in the benchmark case. In such cases, a …rm bene…ts from CVM not because competition is moderated, but because it is able to optimize the pro…tability of its Good customers. Consequently, small changes to the value or the number of Poor customers do not impact …rm pro…ts, even though it may encourage the rival to compete more intensely 30 .
Concluding Comments
The primary contribution of our research is to introduce a competitive perspective to CVM. Previous research on CVM and popular press o¤er numerous managerial prescriptions. For instance, they recommend that …rms should try to make low-value customers more valuable, and …ring those 2 8 The analysis readily extends to the case when I1 < 1, I2 < 1 and k = 0, if we work with the expected pro…tability functions for perceived Good and Poor customers for each …rm in its own customer base. 2 9 We require that the pro…tability of Good customers decreases with inducements beyond the point where average customer pro…tability is zero. For consumption behavior to a¤ect the nature of interactions, we not only require that G (d) and P (d) are di¤erent, but also that there are not too many Good customers, since the average pro…tability depends on .
3 0 A larger change could, however, still reduce pro…ts.
who cannot be transformed. While such prescriptions are research-based and intuitively sound, our analysis suggests that they best apply to …rms that operate in an isolated or non-competitive environment. As is sometimes the case, the simple logic that works in a non-competitive context may not carry over to a competitive setting. We …nd that the competitive dimension provides some interesting and important insights.
1. CVM not only improves customer mix but also reduces overall spending on customers by moderating competition. Managers need to track both aspects when measuring the performance and e¤ectiveness of CVM.
2. Increasing the value of customers can lead to drastically di¤erent outcomes depending on whose value is increased. If low-value customers are made more valuable, this can be counterproductive. Managers can instead focus on improving the value of high-value customers.
3. Even when low-value customers can be identi…ed perfectly, …ring them intensi…es competition and reduces pro…ts. So managers should be cautious when considering such measures.
4. While CVM reduces the extent to which low-value customers are subsidized, even high-value customers may be worse o¤ if CVM moderates competition su¢ ciently. Hence managers should be mindful of potential customer backlash and fairness concerns.
5. With the advent of CVM, a …rm with a prior advantage such as cost-e¢ ciency or di¤erenti-ation may …nd itself worse o¤ unless it achieves a su¢ ciently superior position in CVM.
6. Firms in an industry may become worse o¤ as CVM becomes more a¤ordable. So they have an incentive to self-regulate their ability to collect or use customer information.
We now brie ‡y discuss some important limitations of our model and point to possible directions for future research.
In our model, by virtue of being able to identify its own customers, a …rm can identify its rival's customers. This allows the simpli…cation that …rms exactly know the rival's CVM accuracy for any customer. A more general approach would allow for uncertainty in rival's CVM accuracy. A particularly interesting case is when there are new-to-market customers about whom neither …rm has any information. Then a …rm cannot distinguish between rival's customers, about whom the rival has information, and new-to-market customers, about whom the rival has no information.
On the one hand, new-to-market customers may intensify competition as it reduces the number of customers about whom the rival has better information. On the other hand, the skimming e¤ect that moderates competition for rival's customers could spill-over to the new-to-market customers as well.
We have restricted attention to a single period of interaction between the …rms. It would be interesting to extend the model along the lines of Villas-Boas (1999) to multiple period of interactions, which would allow …rms to learn about the customer types, and overlapping generations of customers, which would maintain uncertainty about customer types. In general, as …rms learn more about a customer, their classi…cations become more similar, which is likely to intensify competition. But it also gives rise to non-trivial inter-temporal incentives. Di¤erences in customer value may arise from di¤erences along multiple dimensions such as costto-serve, basket of goods and services they buy, purchase frequency, volume and so on. While we abstract away from these di¤erences, a richer model of customer behavior can examine the impact of these di¤erent dimensions.
Finally, we do not consider that …rms may di¤er in the manner or type of inducements they o¤er. For instance, Syam and Hess (2007) consider the timing of di¤erential rewards to "loyal club" customers to vary depending on whether the …rm adopts an acquisition (early rewards) or retention (later rewards) strategy. They …nd that, contrary to popular notions, a retention strategy may not always be the right approach in a competitive CRM setting.
Notwithstanding these limitations, we hope that our work will help advance the understanding of CVM and motivate further research.
